Protections for Virtual Property:  A Modern Restitutionary Approach by Ludwig, Jordan L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
9-1-2011
Protections for Virtual Property: A Modern
Restitutionary Approach
Jordan L. Ludwig
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jordan L. Ludwig, Protections for Virtual Property: A Modern Restitutionary Approach, 32 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 1 (2011).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol32/iss1/1
  
 
1 
PROTECTIONS FOR VIRTUAL PROPERTY: 
A MODERN RESTITUTIONARY APPROACH 
“Why would anyone pay $50,000 for a virtual property?”1 
Jordan L. Ludwig* 
 
Virtual online worlds have become a staple of modern society.  
Through an avatar, individuals may enter into virtual worlds, where they 
can do anything from completing epic quests to speculating on virtual “real 
estate.”  Many virtual worlds have unique currencies, which have real-
world value because of the high demand for in-game property.  Disputes 
over virtual property, however, remain mostly, if not entirely, ungoverned 
by any body of law.  This Comment seeks to address how to handle con-
flicts that arise over virtual world property.  It concludes that the reemerg-
ing law of restitution, as promulgated in the Restatement (Third) of Restitu-
tion and Unjust Enrichment, provides the breadth and flexibility necessary 
to properly resolve legal disputes that have, and will continue to arise over 
virtual property in virtual worlds. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As foreign as they may seem, virtual worlds2 have become an increas-
ingly potent economic force.3  For example, economists estimated that in 
2007, the total gross domestic product of virtual worlds surpassed seven 
                                                           
1.  Regina Lynn, Stroker Serpentine, Second Life’s Porn Mogul, Speaks, WIRED (Mar. 30, 
2007), http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/sexdrive/2007/03/sex_drive0330. 
*  J.D., Loyola Law School, 2011; B.A., University of Maryland, College Park, 2008.  The 
author would like to give special thanks to Professor Bob Brain for his extremely helpful guid-
ance in selecting and narrowing this topic to a manageable level.  Additionally, the author would 
like to thank the staff of Volumes 31 and 32 of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Re-
view for its hard work editing this article.  Particular gratitude is owed to Chief Production Edi-
tors Matt Carter and Jenna Spatz, as well as to Jackie Lecholtz-Zey and Jay Jeffrey Fragus. 
2.  See infra Part II.A. 
3.  Bobby Glushko, Note, Tales of the (Virtual) City:  Governing Property Disputes in 
Virtual Worlds, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507, 507 (2007); see also Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Lib-
erty:  Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2043–44 
(2004) (stating that video games are becoming increasingly lucrative). 
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billion dollars.4  The proliferation of virtual worlds has attracted an im-
mense and continually growing population of users.5  The global video 
game market, which was worth around $56 billion in 2010, is now “twice 
the size of the recorded music industry,” and sales are expected to rise to 
$82 billion by 2015.6 
Perhaps the most surprising feature to those unfamiliar with virtual 
worlds is the vast commercial economy present in each game.  Each world’s 
currency fluctuates with the American dollar from day to day based on rates 
of supply and demand—no different from the euro or the British pound.7  
Like in the real world, almost any item a user is willing to pay for is avail-
able for purchase.8  This item becomes the user’s virtual property.  How-
ever, unlike tangible personal property and real property, virtual property 
does not exist.9  Herein arises the problem this Comment seeks to address. 
In their current state, exchanges between individual gamers in virtual 
worlds are “relatively ungoverned under the laws of most countries.”10  
Contributing to this problem is the fact that it is difficult to equate “a bun-
dle of mathematic algorithms . . . simulat[ing] the look and utility of a real-
world good” with something one would purchase in a real-world store.11  
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that virtual property, both real and personal, 
is valuable to at least a segment of the population.12  As such, protections 
must be in place to ensure that peoples’ rights are protected. 
This is not the first comment to propose protections for virtual prop-
erty rights.13  However, most prior scholarship has focused on applying the 
common law of property or contracts to virtual worlds.14  By contrast, this 
                                                           
4.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 507. 
5.  Alisa B. Steinberg, Note, For Sale—One Level 5 Barbarian for 94,800 Won:  The In-
ternational Effects of Virtual Property and the Legality of Its Ownership, 37 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 381, 385 (2009). 
6.  All the World’s a Game, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21541164. 
7.  See ASHLEY SAUNDERS LIPSON & ROBERT D. BRAIN, COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME 
LAW:  CASES, STATUTES, FORMS, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS 511 (2009). 
8.  See id. (listing items available for purchase, such as clothes, cars, property, concerts, 
and VIP rooms in clubs). 
9.  Id. at 509. 
10.  Steinberg, supra note 5, at 384. 
11.  Theodore J. Westbrook, Comment, Owned:  Finding a Place for Virtual World Prop-
erty Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 780 (2006). 
12.  See, e.g., Farnaz Alemi, An Avatar’s Day in Court:  A Proposal for Obtaining Relief 
and Resolving Disputes in Virtual World Games, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 4–5 (2007). 
13.  See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 5, at 412–19; Westbrook, supra note 11, at 804–11. 
14.  See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 5, at 395–98; Westbrook, supra note 11, at 801–04. 
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paper argues that the reemerging law of restitution and unjust enrichment 
should be used to protect virtual property rights until state legislatures or 
courts take the opportunity to craft their own unique laws.  Part II of this 
Comment provides a background into virtual worlds and disputes over vir-
tual property.  Part III discusses the current governance of virtual worlds, 
past proposals to reform this governance, and the deficiencies of the current 
model and proposed models.  Part IV provides an overview of the law of 
restitution and unjust enrichment, using the Restatement (Third) of Restitu-
tion and Unjust Enrichment (“Restatement (Third)”)15 and various federal 
and state cases, in addition to courts’ interpretation of this complex and 
misunderstood body of law.  Part V discusses a proposed application of res-
titution and unjust enrichment principles to virtual property rights.  Lastly, 
Part VI contains concluding remarks on the matter. 
II.  BACKGROUND:  VIRTUAL WORLDS AND VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
A.  Video Games vs. Virtual Worlds 
As many readers may be unfamiliar with what exactly constitutes a 
virtual world, some background will be helpful.  First, virtual worlds must 
be distinguished from typical video games.  Video game law scholars Lip-
son and Brain identify two discernible characteristics: 
(1) [A] “game” is static in the sense that nothing happens in the 
world once “Game Over” appears, whereas virtual worlds are 
active 24/7 and constantly change, even when a particular player 
is not in them; and (2) virtual worlds allow for interaction 
among all the many thousands of users [or more] who may be 
logged on at the same time.16 
This distinction raises the question:  what attracts users to dedicate so 
much time and money to virtual worlds when there is no clear objective or 
endgame involved? 
In an influential article, authors F. Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter 
suggest such enjoyment lies in the “rich social interaction” that virtual 
worlds provide.17  While some virtual worlds resemble a traditional video 
                                                           
15.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Discussion Draft 
2000). 
16.  LIPSON & BRAIN, supra note 7, at 505–06. 
17.  F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2004) (noting that the average player of EverQuest, a popular virtual world, “spends 
about twenty hours a week within the . . . world”). 
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game, in that they contain elements of completing quests and adventures, 
others center on the social interactions between users.18  For example, in 
one world known as There, users can have a drink at a tiki bar or hike a 
volcano.19  It is easy to see how this opportunity could appeal to someone 
who lacks the wherewithal to enjoy this vacation in the real world or to 
someone who is simply looking for a new social scene. 
B.  Economic Implications of Virtual Worlds 
Virtual worlds do not simply provide their users with social opportu-
nities and other intangible benefits, such as exploring an exotic place.20  
Like the real world, virtual worlds offer fertile ground for business ven-
tures.21  This fact is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of virtual worlds, as 
it may be perplexing to grasp how one can earn an income from participat-
ing in something that essentially is intangible. 
Virtual worlds such as Second Life have become so popular that “it is 
now possible to work in a fantasy world to pay rent in reality.”22  For ex-
ample, one Michigan resident, while unemployed for three and a half years, 
earned a sole income of approximately $25,000 per year by trading artifacts 
in the virtual world Ultima Online.23  In Ultima Online, virtual goods range 
from a $5 pair of sandals to a $150 battle axe to a $750 fortress.24  Much 
more uncommon, but still in existence, are people who have amassed a vast 
amount of wealth participating in virtual worlds. 
A 2006 study reported that at least ten users of Second Life earned 
over $200,000 from in-game commercial activity.25  For example, “Anshe 
Chung” is the first virtual world millionaire.26  Chung amassed approxi-
mately one million dollars in assets in Second Life and other virtual 
worlds.27  Chung, the avatar of Ailin Graef (CEO of Anshe Chung Studios), 
obtained this fortune by selling virtual real estate.28 
                                                           
18.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 509–10. 
19.  Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 8–9. 
20.  See, e.g., id. at 1. 
21.  See Alemi, supra note 12, at 2–4. 
22.  Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 11. 
23.  Alemi, supra note 12, at 4–5. 
24.  LIPSON & BRAIN, supra note 7, at 512. 
25.  Id. at 513. 
26.  Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1051 n.221 (2009). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Kurt Hunt, Note, This Land Is Not Your Land:  Second Life, CopyBot, and the Loom-
ing Question of Virtual Property Rights, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 141, 143 (2007). 
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Regrettably, the prospect of money inevitably invites crime and 
fraud.29  Like the real world, virtual worlds have become home to fraudu-
lent investment schemes that swindle users out of substantial amounts of 
money.30  The tolerance of this deceit, the considerable latitude given to 
players in perpetrating these schemes, and the impunity that accompanies 
it, account for a large part of the problem of virtual worlds. 
C.  The Real World Consequences of Having  
No Virtual Property Protections 
The following incidents will serve as baseline paradigms for the re-
mainder of this Comment to help illustrate important principles articulated 
within.  The first set illustrates the types of conflicts that can arise among 
users of virtual worlds.  The second describes a district court case that will 
serve as a paradigm for conflicts between users and developers. 
1.  Paradigm 1:  Conflicts Among Users 
Several financial scandals have precipitated conflict among virtual 
world users.31  One notable scandal occurred in EVE Online32 when the 
EVE Investment Bank defrauded its investors of $125,000.33  One avatar, 
known as “Cally,” created the Eve Investment Bank, which promised large-
scale investors a yield of nine percent interest.34  Cally collected hundreds 
of billions of Inter Stellar Kredits (the in-game currency) over a nine-month 
period and eventually vanished, taking all of the investors’ money.35  The 
disappearance of such an immense sum of money from market circulation 
“sent shockwaves through the virtual economy and threw the EVE Online 
community into chaos.”36 
                                                           
29.  See, e.g., srfto, Stealing in Virtual Worlds Is a Real Crime, GOSSIP GAMERS (Jan. 20, 
2009, 2:59 PM) http://www.gossipgamers.com/stealing-in-virtual-worlds-is-a-real-crime/ (re-
counting the story of a young boy defrauded of his in-game items by an adult scammer). 
30.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
31.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 521–22. 
32.  See id. at 521–23 (describing the EVE Online scandal). 
33.  Id. at 521. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 522. 
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A similar situation resulted with the Ginko Financial Bank in Second 
Life.37  Ginko Financial promised an exorbitant forty-four percent annual 
return on investments.38  “Nicholas Portocarrero,” the avatar who ran the 
bank, would not reveal his investments.39  After two major financial events 
occurred in Second Life, investors panicked and tried to withdraw more 
funds than Ginko Financial had available.40  Eventually, Ginko Financial 
declared itself to be insolvent, and Portocarrero ceased logging into Second 
Life.41  Many analysts agree that Ginko Financial was a Ponzi scheme.42  
Overall, Ginko Financial Bank owed approximately $740,000 in obliga-
tions to its investors.43 
Unfortunately, the consequences of disputes among virtual world us-
ers can be far more tragic than financial loss.44  In June 2005 Qiu Cheng-
wei, a Legend of Mir III player, murdered another player over an in-game 
property dispute.45  Qiu had lent the victim a rare, enchanted in-game 
sword, which the victim then sold for approximately $870.46  After Qiu 
contacted the authorities, who “refused to take any steps to redress the in-
jury,” Qiu tragically and fatally took matters into his own hands.47 
These scenarios illustrate why protections providing for the recovery 
of virtual property are essential.  The avatar who ran Ginko Financial Bank 
was able to leave Second Life with impunity, leaving “no trail for authori-
ties to follow, if there had been any authorities.”48  Furthermore, in the af-
termath of the Ginko incident, a Los Angeles Times article reported:  
“There have been some calls for the government to step in, but Washington 
                                                           
37.  See Amanda J. Penick, Comment, Legal Recourse When Virtual-World Banks Pack 
Up Their Toys and Go Home, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 233, 237–40 (2008) (describing Ginko Financial 
Bank’s economic status). 
38.  Id. at 237–38. 
39.  Id. at 238. 
40.  See id. at 239–40. 
41.  Id. at 240. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Penick, supra note 37, at 240. 
44.  Westbrook, supra note 11, at 789 (explaining that the events in virtual life have real-
world consequences). 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Alana Semuels, Virtual Bank’s Second Life Scheme Raises Real Concerns, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at C1. 
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is pretty much scratching its head right now.  ‘Most members of Congress 
don’t understand what this is all about . . . .’”49 
2.  Paradigm 2:  Conflicts Between Users and Developers 
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc. became the first case to test virtual 
property rights in an American court.50  Marc Bragg’s avatar, “Mark Woe-
begone,” was “a moderately successful nightclub owner and inventor in 
Second Life.”51  Bragg also invested in virtual land—an investment he 
claims was “induced” by representations made by the operators of Second 
Life, Linden and its CEO Philip Rosedale.52  Bragg purchased a parcel of 
land, known as “Taessot,” by “exploiting a loophole within Second Life’s 
auction software.”53  After Linden learned of this improper purchase, it 
froze Bragg’s account, which “effectively confiscat[ed] all of the virtual 
property and currency that he maintained . . . [in] Second Life.”54  Linden 
did not compensate Bragg and intended to resell his land and nightclub to 
another user.55  Bragg brought suit under several causes of action, including 
“violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Pro-
tection law, fraud, conversion, intentional interference with contractual re-
lations, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and tortious breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”56  Linden, pursuant to Second 
Life’s Terms of Service (“TOS”), moved to compel arbitration.57 
Unfortunately, the court did not rule on any issue other than the arbi-
tration clause of the TOS.58  One commentator called Bragg a “missed op-
portunity.”59  The court merely held that the compulsory arbitration clause 
was unconscionable, and thus, unenforceable.60  Bragg and Linden ulti-
mately settled out of court, leaving the question of virtual property rights in 
                                                           
49.  Id. (quoting Dan Miller, a senior economist with the Congressional Joint Economic 
Committee). 
50.  Steven J. Horowitz, Note, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 443, 449 (2007); see Steinberg, supra note 5, at 406, 410 (describing two previous 
lawsuits that did not go to trial). 
51.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 524. 
52.  Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596–97 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
53.  Steinberg, supra note 5, at 411; Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 597. 
54.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 597. 
55.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 525. 
56.  Steinberg, supra note 5, at 411. 
57.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 603. 
58.  Steinberg, supra note 5, at 411–12. 
59.  Id. at 412. 
60.  Id. at 411–12. 
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the United States unanswered.61  The U.S. courts and legislatures are no 
further along in regulating virtual property than many years ago, when the 
virtual world industry was first emerging.62  It is in this context that my 
proposal is rooted.  However, a discussion of relevant law must come first. 
III.  THE LAW OF VIRTUAL WORLDS 
This section is broken down into two parts.  The first part discusses 
the contracts between users and developers that are currently the only 
source of governance of virtual worlds, in addition to past proposals that 
other authors have posited.  The second part discusses the current inade-
quacies of the existing system and the flaws of prior proposals. 
A.  Current and Proposed Protections for Virtual Property 
1.  Terms of Service and End User Licensing Agreements as  
Governing Devices 
Because of the failure of Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc. to articulate 
any law governing virtual property,63 the sole source of governance over 
virtual worlds and virtual property lies in the software’s Terms of Service 
(“TOS”) or End User License Agreements (“EULAs”).64  These agree-
ments create a contract65 between the software developer and the user, 
which enumerate specific rights and prohibitions that accompany game-
play.  If users decline to agree to the TOS or EULA, they are prohibited 
from entering the “world.”66  Professor Balkin provides the following ex-
planation of the typical TOS and EULA: 
                                                           
61.  Id. at 412. 
62.  See id. at 384–85. 
63.  See generally Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
64.  See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts:  The Contractual Governance of 
Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 429 (2008) [hereinafter Anti-Social Contracts]. 
65.  There is a circuit split regarding the enforceability of contracts of this type (known 
also as “clickwrap” or “shrinkwrap licenses”).  For example, in the well known case of ProCD, 
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996), Circuit Judge Easterbrook wrote, 
“[s]hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable 
to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or if they are uncon-
scionable).”  In contrast, in Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002), 
then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor wrote that these agreements were unenforceable if “a reasonably 
prudent Internet user in circumstances such as these would not have known or learned of the exis-
tence of the license terms before responding to defendants’ invitation . . .” 
66.  For example, the preface to the Second Life TOS provides: 
 This agreement (“Agreement” or the “Terms of Service”) describes the terms 
on which Linden Research, Inc. and Linden Research United Kingdom, Ltd. (col-
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[G]ame designers can control what goes on in the game through 
contract.  In most cases, in order to participate in virtual worlds, 
players must agree to the platform owner’s Terms of Service . . . 
or End User License Agreement . . . .  The EULA covers fea-
tures of proper play and decorum that cannot easily be written 
into the code.  Game designers enforce social norms in the game 
space by kicking out (or threatening to kick out) people who vio-
late the EULA.67 
Another commentator claims that the purpose of the EULA is to “pro-
tect the investments of the world-makers, to curb liability, and to allow 
game developers to retain a measure of control over the goings-on in the 
virtual world.”68  In short, the TOS and EULA appear to favor the rights of 
the developer over the rights of the user.  With this in mind, the following 
paragraphs will examine the role of the TOS and EULA in the arena of vir-
tual property. 
At a virtual world’s creation, the developer has property rights to eve-
rything in it.69  The development of a virtual world is obviously an exacting 
task.  However, conflicts over ownership are bound to arise, as they did in 
Bragg,70 when users are permitted to bring their own objects into, or create 
objects within, the developer’s world.71  If users devote their time and ef-
                                                           
lectively “Linden Lab”) offer you access to Second Life . . . .  This offer is condi-
tioned on your agreement to all of the terms and conditions contained in the Terms 
of Service, including the policies and terms linked to or otherwise referenced in 
this Agreement.   
 By using Second Life, you agree to and accept these Terms of Service.  If you 
do not so agree, you should decline this Agreement, in which case you are prohib-
ited from accessing or using Second Life. 
Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Mar. 15, 
2012) [hereinafter Second Life TOS]. 
67.  Balkin, supra note 3, at 2049. 
68.  Westbrook, supra note 11, at 788–89. 
69.  LIPSON & BRAIN, supra note 7, at 510.  This is consistent with John Locke’s labor-
desert theory, which states that if an individual (in this case, the developer) has invested time and 
labor into developing and acquiring possessions, that individual deserves property rights.  Horow-
itz, supra note 50, at 450–54.  Horowitz discusses two compelling claims in his article.  First, un-
der Locke’s theory, users should have property rights as they have “invested time and effort in 
developing their avatars and acquiring in-world possessions . . . .”  Id. at 450.  In contrast, devel-
opers have a similar claim as the development and maintenance of virtual worlds requires a vast 
amount time and effort as well.  Id.  The author concludes that in Lockean terms, game develop-
ers have a strong claim to their world and the products they create; however, their claim to user-
created goods is “much weaker.”  Id. at 453–54. 
70.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d 593. 
71.  LIPSON & BRAIN, supra note 7, at 510. 
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fort to creating or acquiring unique items, it would seem apparent that they 
should have a claim of ownership to those items.  Rather than deferring to 
“default notions of copyright to decide ownership rights,” game developers 
have placed these rights in their respective EULAs and TOS agreements.72 
Unsurprisingly, these TOS and EULAs insulate, or are at least written 
to insulate, game developers from any suit regarding virtual property.  For 
example, while users maintain the intellectual property rights to their 
original content submissions to Second Life,73 the TOS state, “[y]ou agree 
that Linden Lab has and may exercise the right in its sole discretion to pre-
screen, refuse, or delete any Content or services from the Service or disable 
any user’s access to the Service without notice or liability . . . .”74  Other 
virtual world TOS and EULAs contain similar provisions.75 
From these various TOS and EULA provisions, there is a trend to-
ward developer omnipotence over virtual property rights.  This trend holds 
true even if users retain intellectual property rights to their creations, as 
they do in Second Life.  As seen in Bragg and the Second Life TOS,76 a 
user can invest time and money into creating or maintaining property, only 
to lose it with no compensation or justification.  This model is unsustain-
able in a rapidly growing industry.  In 2004, Lastowka and Hunter sug-
gested: “We will likely see courts rejecting EULAs to the extent that they 
place excessive restrictions on the economic interests of users . . . .  [W]e 
can expect a large number of lawsuits rooted in these property-rights dis-
putes.”77  Surprisingly, Bragg is the only suit to have come to light thus far.  
However, this fact does not reflect virtual world participants’ demand for 
                                                           
72.  Id. 
73.  Second Life TOS, supra note 66, § 7.1. 
74.  Id. § 4.3. 
75.  For example, the EVE Online EULA states,  
 [y]ou have no interest in the value of your time spent playing the Game, for 
example, by the building up of the experience level of your character and the items 
your character accumulates during your time playing the Game.  Your Account, and 
all attributes of your Account, including all corporations, actions, groups, titles and 
characters, and all objects, currency and items acquired, developed or delivered by 
or to characters as a result of play through your Accounts, are the sole and exclu-
sive property of CCP, including any and all copyrights and intellectual property 
rights in or to any and all of the same, all of which are hereby expressly reserved. 
End User License Agreement, § 11(B), EVE ONLINE, http://www.eveonline.com/pnp/eula.asp 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2012); see also World of Warcraft Terms of Use, § 7, BLIZZARD.COM, 
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
76.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d 593; Second Life TOS, supra note 66, § 4.3. 
77.  Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 50–51. 
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rights.78  For instance, one virtual world theorist proposed a “Declaration of 
the Rights of Avatars,” modeled after the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and the U.S. Bill of Rights.79 
Regrettably, players do not have a similar doctrine of rights.80  Rather, 
as one author argues, it is the EULAs that “function as a mix between a 
constitution and a holy book.”81  Scholars criticize this model, whereby 
players remain bound by the strict terms of the TOS or EULA of their re-
spective worlds.82  The next section explores several past proposals provid-
ing alternatives to the status quo. 
2.  Prior Proposals to Protect Virtual Property 
This subsection briefly discusses scholarship concerning protections for 
virtual property, including (a) the application of the common law of property 
and (b) the application of the common law of contract to virtual worlds. 
a.  Property law 
Scholars advocate for the application of common law property to vir-
tual property interests, which is perhaps the most obvious answer to the 
problem of the lack of virtual world property rights.83  On a theoretical 
level, several articles extensively discuss the application of the very foun-
dations of property theory to virtual property ownership and interests.84  
Other scholars take a more practical approach, advocating that the common 
law of property be used to provide protections for virtual property inter-
ests.85 
For example, one commentator argues, “certain virtual property 
shares many of the characteristics [of] actual property, and should not be 
excluded from legal protection as property simply because it initially seems 
                                                           
78.  Id. at 51 (stating that some believe avatars should have a political voice). 
79.  See id. 
80.  Id. at 52–53 (arguing that rights for virtual worlds are controversial). 
81.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 516. 
82.  See Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 429 (arguing that EULAs are not the 
“best tool” for governing virtual worlds); see also Fairfield, supra note 26, at 1022 (arguing that 
game creators should not exert so much control over users). 
83.  Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 50. 
84.  See LIPSON & BRAIN, supra note 7, at 509–10 (applying traditional property laws to 
virtual worlds).  See generally Horowitz, supra note 50 (arguing that users have strong property 
rights in virtual worlds); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 44–50 (applying utilitarian and 
personality theories of property, in addition to the Lockean theory). 
85.  See Hunt, supra note 28, at 172 (arguing that virtual worlds should be entitled to pro-
tection under common property laws). 
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unfamiliar.”86  Thus, applying the common law of property to virtual 
worlds would provide adjudicative bodies with a set of predictable and eq-
uitable rules.87  Another author suggests the possibility of implementing an 
adverse possession standard in virtual worlds.88  Yet another interesting ar-
ticle analyzes whether various aspects of the common law of property, such 
as the laws of finders, gifts, abandonment, and adverse possession, apply 
within Second Life.89  Although some of these traditional property con-
cepts, such as the law of gifts, actually apply within virtual worlds, the 
authors are careful to note that the applicability of these concepts is limited 
in scope.90  The foregoing are a few examples of the common law of prop-
erty’s application to virtual worlds; several other scholars have made simi-
lar suggestions.  Still, other authors have suggested applying contract law 
to protect virtual property rights.91 
b.  Contract law 
Because contracts (in the forms of TOS and EULAs) are the only 
governing feature of virtual worlds, a relatively large body of scholarship 
addresses contract law’s application to virtual worlds.92  Much is written on 
the deficiencies of TOS and EULAs governing virtual worlds,93 but less is 
written on applying contractual remedies to facilitate virtual property pro-
tection.94  The two, however, are inextricably linked, causing some authors 
to apply contractual remedies to virtual worlds.95 
Kurt Hunt, author of a leading article on the topic, argues that virtual 
world users have the potential to assert contractual defenses of unconscion-
ability, misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel in response to the 
“EULA problem.”96  Regarding unconscionability, Hunt asserts that in order 
                                                           
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Steinberg, supra note 5, at 420. 
89.  See Elizabeth Townsend Gard & Rachel Goda, The Fizzy Experiment:  Second Life, 
Virtual Property and a 1L Property Course, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
915, 935–40 (2008). 
90.  See id. at 957. 
91.  See Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 432 (stating that contract law governs 
online communities). 
92.  See, e.g., id. at 435–38. 
93.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
94.  See Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 438 (stating that there is a significant lit-
erature gap in examining the application of contract law to virtual worlds). 
95.  See id. (arguing that people erroneously believe that contract law has unlimited ability 
to govern virtual worlds). 
96.  Hunt, supra note 28, at 153. 
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for the court to “void[] any part of a virtual world EULA,” it must issue a 
holding of substantive unconscionability—a holding he believes is possi-
ble.97  Similarly, in his view, misrepresentation may be utilized to allow a 
user to recover “without ever having to reach the question of property rights 
in virtual property.”98  Lastly, Hunt states that there may be a potential cause 
of action under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.99  For example, a court 
may find that game creators induced players to invest real money in the 
game based upon “the apparent ‘realness’ of their in-game money.”100 
While these arguments are persuasive, their application is limited by 
their own very nature and by that of current virtual world governance and 
functionality.101  In contrast, the law of restitution and unjust enrichment, 
which will be discussed in later sections, provides the breadth and flexibil-
ity that traditional property and contract law do not.102 
B.  The Lack of Virtual World Protections 
Because of this issue’s novelty, there is very little case law or statu-
tory authority to critique.  Even so, the current state of the law is arguably 
imperfect.  Part 1 of this subsection discusses the inadequacies of TOS and 
EULAs to govern virtual worlds, and Part 2 discusses the shortcomings of 
other authors’ proposals. 
1.  EULAs and TOS Are Insufficient to Govern Virtual Worlds 
As discussed above,103 the creators of virtual worlds use TOS and 
EULAs as substitutes for the law that governs real-world activity.104  These 
contracts, however, are insufficient governing mechanisms.  As virtual 
worlds become more advanced and more closely reflect the real world, a 
contract, no matter how sophisticated and detailed, will simply be unable to 
handle the gamut of scenarios that will inevitably arise.105  One author 
writes, “[p]roperty and tort systems are good examples of the kind of back-
ground, default rules that communities need but that contracts cannot 
cheaply provide.  Protection of private property and protection of personal 
                                                           
97.  Id. at 154. 
98.  Id. at 155. 
99.  Id. at 155–56. 
100.  Id. at 155. 
101.  See generally supra Part III.A.1. 
102.  See generally infra Part IV. 
103.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
104.  See generally Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 429. 
105.  See id. at 429–30. 
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and dignitary interests are . . . critical to online communities . . . .”106  The 
law is not restricted to contract because contract is limited in scope—
namely, protecting against the unjust breach of a promise.107  As seen in the 
EVE Online and Second Life financial scandals, the injuries that users can 
sustain in virtual worlds extend beyond the scope of contract law.108 
The United States lags behind other nations in enforcing virtual prop-
erty rights.109  For example, South Korea applies its criminal law to enforce 
virtual world norms.  Chinese courts apply labor law to virtual worlds, stat-
ing that a “game service provider must return virtual property to [a] player 
who has worked to obtain it.”110  Likewise, the Hong Kong police instituted 
a Technology Crimes Division, whose province includes virtual world 
property theft.111  By contrast, U.S. courts have taken no action to resolve 
the problem of virtual property disputes.112  Furthermore, this author knows 
of no agency that specializes in, or even responds to, disputes in virtual 
worlds.  Accordingly, as of this writing, virtual worlds in the United States 
are governed solely by “private law contract.”113 
Regrettably, the contracts that govern virtual worlds do not provide 
adequate protection for even the most basic property interests.114  For ex-
ample, the developers of EVE Online took no action against the avatar 
known as Cally who perpetrated the scandal.115  The reason given for fail-
ing to take punitive action against the avatar was that she had not violated 
any rule of the game.116  However, one author, after having read and ana-
lyzed the EVE Online TOS and EULA, concluded that the “TOS clearly 
                                                           
106.  Id. 
107.  Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity:  An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust En-
richment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2108 (2001). 
108.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 520–22; Penick, supra note 37, at 237–40. 
109.  See Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 430 (stating that the U.S. relies on pri-
vate contract law to govern virtual worlds, while many other countries favor public legislation). 
110.  Id. 
111.  See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 409. 
112.  See id. at 410–12 (stating that Bragg was a “missed opportunity” for U.S. courts and 
quoting game developer Raph Koster:  “The [virtual world] industry has once again managed to 
dodge legal questions regarding ownership of ‘virtual property.’”). 
113.  See Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 430. 
114.  See, e.g., Glushko, supra note 3, at 527–28 (stating that existing EULAs are inade-
quate to govern virtual worlds, which will become increasingly apparent as those virtual worlds 
continue to grow). 
115.  See Hannah Yee Fen Lim, Who Monitors the Monitor?  Virtual World Governance 
and the Failure of Contract Law Remedies in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1053, 
1063 (2009); see supra Part II.B.1.a. 
116.  See Lim, supra note 115, at 1063. 
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forbids . . . any form of pyramid scheme . . . .”117  This exemplifies a fun-
damental problem of contractual governance of virtual worlds; users and 
developers can interpret the governing contracts in completely different 
ways.  In the EVE Online investment scandal, the developer did not disci-
pline the user because the developer believed no violation of the TOS oc-
curred; however, a legal scholar reached the opposite conclusion.118 
It is also worth noting that had the developer reached the conclusion 
that Cally violated the TOS, terminating Cally’s account was the only 
remedy available to injured players.119  While this remedy might provide 
some vindication for injured players, it clearly will not leave them finan-
cially whole.  Based on the foregoing paragraphs, contract law cannot 
solely sustain the governance of virtual worlds.  While contract law may be 
appropriate in some instances, the field is not broad enough to protect the 
rights of users on its own. 
2.  Current Proposals Cannot Effectively Protect Virtual World Users’ 
Virtual Property Rights 
a.  Property law 
Proposals to treat virtual property as real property (meaning tangible 
real-world property, not land), and, therefore, provide it with common law 
property protections, are persuasive.120  In fact, over the past two centuries, 
traditional property law has evolved to provide far greater protections for 
intangible property interests—namely, in the area of intellectual prop-
erty.121  Despite this shift, property law is likely insufficient to fully protect 
virtual property interests.122 
First, there is a serious question whether courts will consider property 
that is acquired in the virtual world.  In Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., the 
Pennsylvania District Court had the opportunity to recognize a virtual 
property right in Marc Bragg’s virtual real estate and personal property,123 
                                                           
117.  Id. at 1064. 
118.  See id. 
119.  Id. at 1064 (noting that neither the EULA nor TOS for EVE Online contains a clause 
to recompense players who have been defrauded). 
120.  See Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 452 (noting that a real property-type sys-
tem would be a “significant step forward” in providing legal rights for virtual world members). 
121.  Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 17, at 40–41. 
122.  See Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 451–52 (noting that work is required 
before property law can be applied to online property). 
123.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595. 
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but chose not to rule on the issue.124  It is reasonable to believe that other 
courts may follow a similar path of avoidance.125 
Furthermore, courts may be hesitant to apply doctrines such as ad-
verse possession to virtual worlds.126  Adverse possession “generally cre-
ates an absolute title to real property in fee simple, which is as good as title 
by patent from the state or title by deed from the record owner . . . .”127  
There is no “title” involved in the acquisition of virtual real property.  
Moreover, there are no virtual world equivalents to recording systems or 
title assurance—items traditionally associated with real property acquisi-
tion.128  Consequently, judges may be unable to apply this doctrine to vir-
tual property.  Lastly, issues exist regarding conferring virtual real property 
in “fee simple.”  If, for instance, the developer went out of business and 
was forced to shut down its servers, the shutdown would effectively deny 
virtual real property owners of a true fee simple absolute. 
Applying property law to the paradigms listed in the background sec-
tion of this Comment further demonstrates its inadequacy to govern virtual 
worlds.129  First, in a conflict among users, such as the EVE Online and 
Second Life Ponzi schemes, property law likely offers no remedy.130  Be-
cause disputes of this variety often focus on virtual currency,131 virtual cur-
rency first must be classified as a type of property.  A virtual personal prop-
erty classification makes the most sense in this instance.  Even so, there are 
no clear property principles that would provide recovery in this context.  
While an aggrieved user may sue for conversion or trespass to chattels, 
these are causes of action in tort, and recovery in property would be diffi-
cult. 
Recovery might be easier under the Bragg paradigm.  Recall that in 
Bragg, virtual real property was confiscated from the plaintiff.132  It is pos-
sible that the plaintiff in such a paradigm may be able to successfully assert 
                                                           
124.  Steinberg, supra note 5, at 410–12 (explaining that because Bragg settled, courts 
were unable to “make a strong statement for the existence of virtual property as legally protected 
property”) (emphasis added). 
125.  See id. at 412 (noting that when the virtual worlds industry has confronted the issue 
of the existence of legally protectable virtual property in the courts, the industry takes measures to 
dodge the legal question). 
126.  Id. at 412–17. 
127.  3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 1 (2009). 
128.  See e.g., Second Life TOS, supra note 66, § 7. 
129.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
130.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 528 (suggesting that EULAs are not sufficient to invest 
property rights in players); Penick, supra note 37, at 237. 
131.  Glushko, supra note 3, at 521–22; Penick, supra note 37, at 237. 
132.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 597. 
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a wrongful taking argument.133  Some governments have the power of emi-
nent domain that allows “a governmental entity to take privately owned 
property and convert it to public use.”134  A plaintiff might creatively argue 
that game developers are effectively the government of the virtual world 
that they created.  Therefore, under the U.S. Constitution, if developers 
take privately owned land, the taking must be for public use, or just com-
pensation is required.135  Although a stretch, it is not inconceivable that a 
court would hold developers to this standard.136  However, this argument 
only applies to conflicts between users and developers and provides no 
remedy to users in conflict with other users.  Consequently, while there are 
compelling arguments for applying traditional property law to virtual 
worlds, judges may feel uncomfortable doing so. 
b.  Contract law 
As discussed in Part III.B.1, existing TOS and EULAs provide inade-
quate protections for virtual world property rights.  This short subsection 
explains why several more specific doctrines of contract law also do not 
provide the necessary protections for virtual world users. 
One author has suggested using the doctrines of unconscionability, 
misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel to protect virtual world users 
by voiding existing EULAs and TOS.137  These arguments are persuasive, 
yet they suffer from one flaw that renders them insufficient to provide ade-
quate virtual property protections:  these doctrines provide virtually no pro-
tections in the first paradigm of this paper—conflicts between users. 
When users enter a virtual world, they enter into a “clickwrap” 
agreement with the developer.138  While this clickwrap agreement may be 
an enforceable contract governing conduct in a virtual world, it is not an 
agreement between users.  In the event of a legal dispute between users, 
there is no contract between the two parties (unless the users entered into a 
private contract, or an implied contract existed).  In effect, the contract doc-
                                                           
133.  See Glushko, supra note 3, at 529. 
134.  26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 2 (2004). 
135.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
136.  See generally Glushko, supra 3 note, at 529 (analogizing the act of developers delet-
ing accounts to the act of governments taking property); Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 64, at 
1058 (comparing constitutional and federal causes of action to the state of remedies available to 
“denizens of virtual worlds”). 
137.  Hunt, supra note 28, at 153–56. 
138.  See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2002) (dis-
cussing how users would enter into such an agreement). 
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trines of unconscionability, misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel 
would be irrelevant in most conflicts of this variety. 
On the other hand, these doctrines might be relevant for the Bragg 
paradigm.  The Bragg court held that the arbitration provision of the EULA 
in question was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.139  There 
are compelling reasons, many of which have been mentioned in this Com-
ment, explicating why a court may hold a TOS or EULA term substantively 
unconscionable.  Terms that allow developers to confiscate or remove user 
content (property) at any time and for any reason140 almost beg a holding of 
substantive unconscionability.  Nevertheless, one significant problem with 
using contract law remains:  contractual uncertainty. 
Therefore, while contract law may provide some protections in the 
case of a conflict between a virtual world user and a developer, the existing 
state of TOS and EULAs limit the protections contract law is capable of 
providing when the conflict is between users.  The last two parts of this 
Comment explore an alternative that provides superior protection to virtual 
property rights than property and contract law.  This alternative is the law 
of restitution and unjust enrichment. 
IV.  RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The law of restitution and unjust enrichment is a vast and complex 
area of the law.  The goal of Subpart A is to provide a concise and cohesive 
background to the guiding principles of restitution and a few specific areas 
of the law that pertain to the problem at hand.  Subpart B provides a cri-
tique of modern courts’ misapplication of this area of law. 
A.  The Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
1.  Defining Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
The basic principle of restitution and unjust enrichment appears sim-
ple on its face.  Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Un-
just Enrichment (“Restatement (Third)”) states, “[a] person who is unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is liable in restitution to the other.”141  
                                                           
139.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611. 
140.  Second Life TOS, supra note 66, § 4.3. 
141.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discussion 
Draft 2000) (defining in the comments the terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” and ex-
plaining that they are inextricably linked with each other.  First, comment a states that liability in 
restitution is “the receipt of an economic benefit under circumstances such that its retention with-
out payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plain-
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Despite this apparent simplicity, scholars, judges, and lawyers remain un-
certain about the law.142  As Professor Kull, a leading scholar in the field, 
argues, “[s]ignificant uncertainty shrouds the modern law of restitution.”143  
This uncertainty exists notwithstanding the fact that restitution is a “fun-
damental part of our law.”144 
A vigorous and ongoing academic debate surrounds the definition of 
restitution and unjust enrichment.145  The broadest controversy surrounding 
the law of restitution focuses on whether restitution is a body of law in it-
self, or whether it is merely remedial.146  Restatement (Third) controver-
sially adopts the former approach, stating: 
 A more important misconception is that restitution is essen-
tially a remedy, available in certain circumstances to enforce ob-
ligations derived from torts, contracts, and other topics of sub-
stantive law.  On the contrary, restitution . . . is itself a source of 
obligations, analogous in this respect to tort or contract.  A li-
ability in restitution is enforced by restitution’s own characteris-
tic remedies, just as a liability in contract is enforced by what we 
think of as contract remedies.  . . . .147 
                                                           
tiff.”  Comment b addresses unjust enrichment as a “term of art” and states, “[t]he substantive 
part of the law of restitution is concerned with identifying those forms of enrichment that the law 
treats as ‘unjust’ for purposes of imposing liability.”). 
142.  Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1995); see 
JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 7 (1951) (arguing that the 
rule of unjust enrichment, like a mathematic equation, appears easy to apply, but, in reality, the con-
cept changes throughout history along with cultural norms); see also Doug Rendleman, Restating 
Restitution:  The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 936 (2008) 
(“Many lawyers, judges, and professors misunderstand and misstate basic restitution principles.”). 
143.  Kull, supra note 142, at 1191; see Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of 
Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1989) (“Few law schools teach a separate course in res-
titution [and] no restitution casebook is in print . . . .”); see also Rendleman, supra note 142, at 
936 (stating “many smaller American states lack a decision on particular restitution points” and 
that states of all sizes have “muddled restitution analysis or have made just plain incorrect restitu-
tion decisions”). 
144.  HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT:  A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC 
VALUES 1 (James Crawford & David Johnston eds., 1997). 
145.  See Kull, supra note 142, at 1193 (“[A] threshold problem confronting the American 
law of restitution . . . is one of definition.”). 
146.  Sherwin, supra note 107, at 2108 (arguing that there are three different ways to un-
derstand restitution law:  (1) providing correction to unjust results, (2) solving restitution prob-
lems, and (3) expressing a common theme); see also Kull, supra note 142, at 1191 (arguing that 
restitution should not be viewed as a remedial option). 
147.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. h (Dis-
cussion Draft 2000) (emphasis omitted). 
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In short, restitution, according to the Restatement (Third), is an inde-
pendent substantive body of law, no different from tort or contract law, 
containing its own rights and remedies.148 
The concept of restitution as an independent substantive body of law 
may seem foreign to many in the legal community.149  It is not often that one 
hears of a claimant suing in restitution.150  For example, if a person steals a 
hundred-dollar bill from another, the injured party may elect to sue in tort, 
perhaps for conversion, instead of restitution.151  However, as Professor Kull 
notes, this wrong both “simultaneously injures the plaintiff and enriches the 
defendant.”152  Accordingly, two separate bases for liability exist—unjust 
loss and unjust enrichment—and the plaintiff may pursue whichever method 
he or she pleases.153  In the majority of cases, however, the distinction be-
tween types of recovery is merely in name, as the plaintiff will ultimately 
have the hundred dollars returned, regardless of the avenue chosen.154 
2.  The Substantive Law of Restitution 
Restitution is a body of law where “(1) substantive liability is based 
on unjust enrichment, (2) the measure of recovery is based on defendant’s 
gain instead of plaintiff’s loss, [or] (3) the court restores to plaintiff, in 
kind, his lost property or proceeds.”155  This perspective is the same as that 
reflected in the Restatement (Third).156 
First, comment a to Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) states, “[t]he 
source of liability in restitution is the receipt of an economic benefit under 
circumstances such that its retention without payment would result in the 
unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff.”157  Pro-
fessor Kull’s second component is reflected in section 2(1), which states, 
                                                           
148.  Id. 
149.  See Kull, supra note 142, at 1222 (commenting that case books and treatises de-
scribe restitution as a remedy and not as an independent source of liability). 
150.  See id. (arguing that plaintiffs sue to recover damages and do not distinguish be-
tween whether restitution is a remedy for a wrong in another area of substantive law or an inde-
pendent source of liability). 
151.  Id. at 1225 (citing an example from Laycock, supra note 143, at 1283). 
152.  Id. 
153.  Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution:  A Case of Contemporary Common Law Con-
ceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487, 500–01 (2007); see also Kull, supra note 142, at 1225. 
154.  Saiman, supra note 153, at 501. 
155.  Kull, supra note 142, at 1224 (quoting Laycock, supra note 143, at 1293) (emphasis 
omitted). 
156.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. h 
(Discussion Draft 2000). 
157.  Id. § 1 cmt. a. 
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“Liability in restitution is based on and measured by the receipt of a bene-
fit . . . .”158  This concept is, of course, contrary to “damages, which meas-
ures the remedy by the plaintiff’s loss . . . .”159  Nevertheless, it is important 
to remember that the receipt of a benefit alone does not necessarily induce 
liability in restitution; the enrichment must be one the law treats as un-
just.160  Lastly, Professor Kull’s third component of restitution is seen in 
Section 4 of the Restatement (Third), which states, “[t]he function of reme-
dies in restitution is to prevent or redress the unjust enrichment of one or 
more persons at the expense of the plaintiff.”161  This may be accomplished 
by a “reformation of instruments,” a monetary judgment that removes any 
unjust enrichment, or the court may confer a superior right to a piece of 
property, fund, or other item in dispute by the plaintiff.162 
The above are merely a few provisions contained in the Restatement 
(Third), and it is important to note that the provisions are part of a discus-
sion draft.  As such, they are subject to change.  However, in the seven ten-
tative drafts published since the project began in 2000, the introductory 
sections (1–4) have remained unchanged.163  Although there are more than 
four sections to the Restatement (Third), the majority are irrelevant to this 
Comment.164  However, several of the relevant provisions will now be dis-
cussed.  A leading treatise states: 
Cases in which there is no tort or relevant contract are often the 
most difficult cases for determining unjust enrichment.  We can 
see that the unjust enrichment conception of restitution will be 
most important in dealing with cases where title reasoning does not 
                                                           
158.  Id. § 2(1). 
159.  DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:  DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 369 (2d 
ed. 1993). 
160.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. a (Dis-
cussion Draft 2000). 
161.  Id. § 4(1). 
162.  Id. § 4(2). 
163.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT Reporter’s 
Introductory Memorandum (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (“The four sections of Chapter 1 will be 
revised and submitted for approval only at the completion of the rest of the project.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 1–4 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 
2010). 
164.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 (Discus-
sion Draft 2000) (discussing instances that give rise to liability in restitution). 
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readily work—especially in cases in which the benefit to the de-
fendant derives from services, money or other intangibles.  . . . . 165 
This concept is extremely important to this Comment.  Since it is de-
batable whether virtual property is governed by traditional property law; 
whether one can be compensated for a virtual tort (if that even exists); or 
whether TOS or EULAs allow for recovery in contract, a body of law ap-
plicable to situations falling within gray areas of the law is particularly use-
ful.  Professor Sherwin argues that “unjust enrichment as a legal princi-
ple . . . encourages judicial creativity.”166  It is this judicial creativity upon 
which my argument is predicated. 
The Restatement (Third) contains many provisions inducing liability 
in restitution.167  First, section 6 states, “[p]ayment of money resulting from 
a mistake as to the existence or extent of the payor’s obligation . . . gives 
the payor a claim in restitution . . . .”168  Perhaps more important is section 
9, stating in pertinent part, “[a] person who confers on another, by mistake, 
a benefit other than money has a claim in restitution as necessary to prevent 
the unjust enrichment of the recipient.”169  This provision is particularly 
important, as it directly recognizes and allows for recovery in restitution for 
conferred benefits other than money.  This language is broad and will play 
an important role in this Comment’s proposal.  Lastly, section 13 provides 
a third relevant provision, stating, “[a] transfer induced by fraud or by an 
innocent, material misrepresentation is subject to rescission at the instance 
of the transferor or a successor in interest.”170  Rescission under this section 
includes a claim to the recovery of benefits conferred.171  In short, this sec-
tion allows recovery in the event a transaction for money, goods, or any 
other benefit, was induced by fraud or misrepresentation. 
                                                           
165.  DOBBS, supra note 159, at 375; see also Saiman, supra note 153, at 491 
(“[R]estitution is shown to be a body of positive law that accounts for recoveries not captured by 
traditional contract and tort doctrine.”) (emphasis added). 
166.  Sherwin, supra note 107, at 2113. 
167.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 6(2), 
9(1), 13(1) (Discussion Draft 2000). 
168.  Id. § 6(2). 
169.  Id. § 9(1) (emphasis added). 
170.  Id. § 13(1). 
171.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 15 (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2001). 
 
2012] PROTECTIONS FOR VIRTUAL PROPERTY 23 
 
B.  Courts’ (Mis)Application of Restitution 
Courts have not handled restitution with a deft hand.172  In fact, one 
commentator complains that two courts’ handlings of restitution and unjust 
enrichment were “little short of gibberish.”173  These words are neither used 
often nor lightly in describing judicial opinions.  However, they are often 
warranted in commenting on many courts’ handling of restitution. 
Unless the Restatement (Third) is incorrect in its assertion that restitu-
tion is an independent substantive body of law, a surprising number of 
courts handle restitution erroneously.174  For example, the Alaska Supreme 
Court wrote, “[u]njust enrichment is not itself a theory of recovery.  
‘Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitu-
tion; that is, if there is no unjust enrichment, there is no basis for restitu-
tion.’”175  This statement accurately reflects the Restatement (Third)’s view 
of restitution and unjust enrichment.176  The court continues, however, stat-
ing, “[r]estitution also is not a cause of action; it is a remedy for various 
causes of action.”177  The misconception that restitution is merely a remedy 
is a common one.178 
Although restitution and unjust enrichment often overlap with con-
tract and tort law, such overlap does not justify misapplying the principles 
of restitution and unjust enrichment.179  There are many instances where 
contract, property, tort, and other areas of law overlap; however, in none of 
those cases is property considered the sole remedy.  Perhaps the most egre-
gious error involving restitution came in a Connecticut Appellate Court 
opinion.  There, the court correctly cited a Restatement (Third) provision, 
but the citation incorrectly included the word “contracts”:  “Restatement 
(Third), Contracts, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, § 2(d) (Discussion 
                                                           
172.  Kull, supra note 142, at 1195 (noting the uncertainty in this area of law). 
173.  James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 56 (2007). 
174.  See generally Kull, supra note 142, at 1195–96 (discussing how modern courts’ and 
counsels’ lack of familiarity with restitution law affects case outcomes). 
175.  Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130, 1143 n.17 (Alaska 1996) 
(quoting Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Millet, 735 P.2d 743, 746 n.6 (Alaska 1987)). 
176.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (Dis-
cussion Draft 2000). 
177.  Reeves, 926 P.2d at 1143 n.17 (citing Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 735 P.2d at 746) 
(emphasis added). 
178.  See Kull, supra note 142, at 1195–96 (noting that if restitution continues to be ne-
glected, it will return to its pre-Restatement status where it was largely classified as remedial). 
179.  See Laycock, supra note 143, at 1283–90 (discussing this overlap and distinguishing 
restitution as a source of liability and a measure of recovery). 
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Draft March 31, 2000).”180  Recall that the Restatement (Third) states that 
restitution is an independent body of law, analogous to contract, not de-
pendent on it.181 
Although the Connecticut Appellate Court’s error is particularly egre-
gious, it is by no means the only error courts have made implementing the 
law of restitution.  There are too many instances to name, but even with the 
advent of the Restatement (Third), courts have been slow to correctly apply 
the law of restitution.182  Accordingly, courts must learn the law of 
restitution, and must begin to apply it correctly if the law of restitution has 
any hope of legitimization. 
V.  PROPOSAL 
Finally, with an understanding of virtual worlds, restitution, and un-
just enrichment, and their current shortcomings in the law, the confluence 
of this emerging legal issue with this flexible remedial body of law—the 
heart of this paper—may now be discussed.  This section correctly applies 
the law of restitution, as articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Restitu-
tion and Unjust Enrichment (“Restatement (Third)”), to the two paradigms 
employed throughout this paper.  This application demonstrates the superi-
ority of restitution over contract law and property law in protecting virtual 
property rights.  Before proceeding to this application, a brief summary of 
overarching restitution principles is warranted. 
                                                           
180.  United Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Clearheart Constr. Co., 802 A.2d 901, 906 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2002) (emphasis added). 
181.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. h (Dis-
cussion Draft 2000); see also Sherwin, supra note 107, at 2108 (noting that tort law is based on 
“unjust harm,” contract law is based on “unjust breach of promise,” and restitution is based 
around “unjust enrichment”). 
182.  Courts in various jurisdictions have misapplied the law of restitution.  See, e.g., 
Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[U]njust en-
richment is an action in quasi-contract . . . .”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de 
Stat, 948 F. Supp. 285, 312 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (stating that unjust enrichment and quantum meruit 
“‘are related theories that are best addressed as a whole[,] since the latter is merely the means by 
which the former is remedied’”) (quoting Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 917 
F. Supp. 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); Williams v. Nat’l Hous. Exch., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 650, 653 
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (stating that “[u]njust enrichment is a quasi-contractual theory of recovery” and 
that if an express contract existed between the parties in dispute, there could be no claim for un-
just enrichment); Melchior v. New Line Prods., Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347, 357 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(citing Dinosaur Dev. Inc. v. White, 265 Cal. Rptr. 525, 527 (Ct. App. 1989)) (stating that unjust 
enrichment is “synonymous” with restitution and that this is not a theory of recovery). 
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A.  Brief Redux 
Restitution is particularly useful for protecting virtual property be-
cause of its flexibility and general principle of preventing unjust enrich-
ment.183  It emerged “to avoid unjust results in specific cases—as a series 
of innovations to fill gaps in the rest of the law.”184  Although the Restate-
ment (Third) has attempted to unify a series of principles that result in un-
just enrichment, the general principle that “unjust enrichment must be dis-
gorged” still remains.185 
Professor Kull noted, “[t]he central problem of the law of restitution 
is to identify those instances of enrichment that the law regards as unjust; in 
other words, to distinguish benefits that have to be paid for from those that 
we can retain without payment.”186  One cannot reasonably argue that the 
perpetrators of the financial schemes discussed in the background section 
of this Comment can justly retain the virtual currency they obtained 
through their fraud.  This conclusion is amplified by applying both Profes-
sor Kull’s three-pronged analysis of restitution and the Restatement 
(Third).  These three central components of restitution will now be applied 
to both paradigms. 
B.  Restitution Under Paradigm 1 
Recall that Professor Kull’s first component of restitution, which is re-
flected in Restatement (Third) section 1, is that a person who is unjustly en-
riched is liable in restitution.187  This is the most basic example of restitution 
and can be clearly applied to the first paradigm concerning virtual property 
disputes.188  The perpetrators of the Second Life and EVE Online scandals, 
and the Legend of Mir III sword thief, were unjustly enriched by any sense 
of the definition.  These individuals took advantage of innocent users who 
entrusted their virtual currency or personal property with others.189  The us-
ers’ trust was then violated by the perpetrators’ deceptive acts.190 
                                                           
183.  Sherwin, supra note 107, at 2108. 
184.  Laycock, supra note 143, at 1278. 
185.  Id. 
186.  Kull, supra note 142, at 1226. 
187.  Id. at 1224 (quoting Laycock, supra note 143, at 1293); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discussion Draft 2000). 
188.  See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
189.  Westbrook, supra note 11, at 789. 
190.  Id. 
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Opponents of this proposal might cite comment b of section 1, which 
states, “[i]n reality, the law of restitution is very far from imposing liability 
for every instance of what might plausibly be called unjust enrichment.”191  
However, the scope of what this Comment is meant to address is outside 
the current problem.  Comment b provides the following instances as ex-
amples where unjust enrichment does not apply:  (1) “the performance of a 
valid contract that was too hard a bargain”; and (2) “profits made through 
another’s misfortune.”192  The first example is inapplicable in the financial 
scheme cases, unless a contract between users existed, and none did.  The 
second example is also inapplicable because the perpetrators of these 
schemes did not profit through anyone’s misfortune; they profited through 
fraud and misrepresentation. 
Fraud and misrepresentation are covered under section 13 of the Re-
statement (Third).193  The Second Life and EVE Online victims have a 
strong case under section 13(1), which states, “[a] transfer induced by 
fraud . . . is subject to rescission . . . .  Rescission under this section includes 
a claim to the recovery of benefits conferred.”194  In the case of financial 
schemes, fraud induced the transfer of virtual currency.195  Users would not 
have transferred their virtual currency had they known the transferee would 
simply flee with it.  Furthermore, the Legend of Mir III player who trans-
ferred his sword to his friend surely intended for it to be returned; otherwise, 
he would not have murdered this friend.196  Had the player been allowed to 
recover the value of the sword, or the sword itself, this tragic crime may 
have been prevented.  In short, in disputes between virtual world users, 
where no contract exists, section 13 provides a compelling means of recov-
ery.  This is not to say that this section provides the exclusive means for re-
covery under restitution—far from it.  However, until more disputes arise in 
virtual worlds, any other hypothetical is purely conjectural. 
Professor Kull’s second component of restitution and section 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) both state that liability in restitution is measured by the 
defendant’s gain, rather than by the plaintiff’s loss.197  This section is far 
                                                           
191.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (Dis-
cussion Draft 2000). 
192.  Id. 
193.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 13(1) (Tentative 
Draft No. 1 2001). 
194.  Id. 
195.  See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
196.  Westbrook, supra note 11, at 789. 
197.  Kull, supra note 142, at 1224 (quoting Laycock, supra note 143, at 1293); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 (Discussion Draft 2000). 
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more straightforward to apply than the previous section.  The only determi-
nation to be made here is the amount by which the defendant was unjustly 
enriched.  This can be calculated by measuring the in-game market value of 
the virtual property wrongfully confiscated.  In the cases of the financial 
scandals or the virtual sword, restitution can be measured by using current 
virtual currency exchange rates to calculate the U.S. dollar amount of vir-
tual currency wrongfully obtained.  For example, the Legend of Mir III 
player who sold the sword was unjustly enriched by the amount for which 
he sold the sword, approximately $870.198 
Lastly, Professor Kull’s third component of restitution and section 4 
of the Restatement (Third) is that the court will restore to plaintiff the 
amount necessary to eliminate the unjust enrichment of the defendant.199  
This amount will be determined the same way as the amount in the preced-
ing paragraph—by using virtual currency rates or the in-game market value 
of the virtual property in question.  Using the Legend of Mir III example, if 
the court found that the defendant was unjustly enriched $870 by wrong-
fully selling another individual’s sword, it could then award the plaintiff 
$870 in restitution. 
C.  Restitution Under Paradigm 2 
As observed several times throughout this Comment, a different dy-
namic exists when the dispute is between a virtual-world developer and a 
virtual world user, such as the conflict that occurred in Bragg v. Linden Re-
search, Inc.200  Chapter 4 of Part II of the Restatement (Third) contains in-
stances of liability in restitution arising when two parties have formed a 
contract.201  For example, section 31 allows for restitution where a contract 
fails for indefiniteness or fails “to satisfy an extrinsic requirement of en-
forceability such as the Statute of Frauds.”202  Comment a of section 31 
states that “[t]here are . . . numerous additional reasons why [a] . . . contract 
might be . . . ‘unenforceable[,]’” such as improper contract formation.203  
Comment a states that these other grounds for unenforceability are covered 
                                                           
198.  Westbrook, supra note 11, at 789. 
199.  Kull, supra note 142, at 1224 (quoting Laycock, supra note 143, at 1293); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 (Discussion Draft 2000). 
200.  Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
201.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 4, pt. II, intro-
ductory note (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004). 
202.  Id. § 31(1)(a)–(b). 
203.  Id. § 31 cmt. a. 
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by Section 9.204  Recall that Section 9 allows for recovery when a benefit 
other than money is unjustly conferred on a recipient.205 
Applying these rules to the Bragg case,206 it is possible that had the 
court employed the Restatement (Third), Bragg would have been compen-
sated for his virtual property.207  Because the court ruled that part of the 
EULA was unconscionable, the court could have potentially invalidated the 
contract or specific provisions of the contract.208  Therefore, even if Bragg 
had violated the contract first, if the contract was unenforceable, Bragg’s 
violation should not matter.  The virtual real property and personal property 
in question should be classified as a benefit conferred other than money.  
Linden Lab would have been unjustly enriched by its retention and resale 
of Bragg’s virtual property.  Therefore, under sections 2 and 4 of the Re-
statement (Third), Linden would be required to compensate Bragg under 
the law of restitution.209 
The situation that occurred in Bragg is obviously not the only dispute 
that might potentially arise between users and developers.210  Fortunately, 
the breadth of the law of restitution would likely provide for recovery in the 
event a user is wrongfully deprived of virtual property.211  The analysis in 
the foregoing paragraph regarding the enforceability of contracts in sec-
tions 31 and 9 would remain applicable.212  Therefore, incorporating the 
analysis of prior commentators, if plaintiffs could successfully argue mis-
representation or other contractual protections by a developer,213 they could 
recover in restitution under sections 31 and 9.214  This further demonstrates 
                                                           
204.  Id. 
205.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 9(1) (Discussion 
Draft 2000) (“A person who confers on another, by mistake, a benefit other than money has a claim 
in restitution as necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the recipient.”) (emphasis added). 
206.  Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d. 
207.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31(1)(a)–
(b) cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 4(1)–(2) (Discussion Draft 2000). 
208.  See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
209.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 2(1), 4(1)–(2) 
(Discussion Draft 2000). 
210.  See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 595. 
211.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 31(1)(a)–(b) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004). 
212.  Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 9(1) (Dis-
cussion Draft 2000). 
213.  See Hunt, supra note 28, at 155. 
214.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31(1)(a)–(b) 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 9(1) (Discussion Draft 2000). 
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the span and flexibility of restitution in incorporating other areas of more 
traditional law, which a court may not feel comfortable applying to protect 
interests in virtual property. 
The analysis under this paradigm for Professor Kull’s second and 
third components of restitution is the same as under the first paradigm.215  
In brief, the court would determine how much the plaintiff was unjustly en-
riched and subsequently compensate the plaintiff for that amount.  This 
concept can be easily illustrated by applying the Bragg paradigm.216  A 
court would simply take the value that Linden Lab, or any other developer 
involved in a dispute, earned by selling Bragg’s confiscated land and award 
Bragg this value in restitution, assuming, of course, that this action consti-
tuted unjust enrichment. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Virtual worlds continue to increase in number and popularity.217  If 
the technology and sophistication of virtual worlds continues to progress, 
more and more disputes will inevitably arise.  The issue can only avoid liti-
gation for so long, and a court will eventually be forced to rule on it.  Ac-
cordingly, courts must begin to consider the manner in which they will ad-
judicate claims over virtual property.  If applied correctly, restitution and 
unjust enrichment could provide the protections long overdue for virtual 
property.  Restitution has the breadth and elasticity necessary to cover both 
paradigms articulated in this Comment.218  Regardless of whether a court 
chooses to adopt property, contract, tort, restitution, or any other body of 
law, it is indisputable that protections for virtual property are necessary. 
                                                           
215.  Kull, supra note 142, at 1224. 
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217.  See supra Part I. 
218.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
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